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The United States Supreme Court has long played a major role in
defining the relationship between the country's majority institutions
and its indigenous peoples. The history of Supreme Court jurispru-
dence regarding Native Americans has included, on the one hand,
early and continuing recognition of "original" rights of sovereignty
and property on the part of Indian tribes, and, on the other, the
development of doctrine by which such rights are held to have been
abrogated or diminished in favor of majority institutions.' The Court
has also held valid the government's conferral of special benefits to
Native Americans where the benefits have been found to be "tied
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation [of trustee-
ship] toward the Indians."2 Although the Court has in many instances
ruled in favor of Native Americans, its approach in the multiple cases
it has decided involving them could rarely be called therapeutic in the
sense that term is used in the Introduction to this issue. The Court's
jurisprudence in this area provides perhaps the starkest American
example of the appellate judiciary functioning in an antitherapeutic
role in the context of majority-minority conflicts. In this brief Article,
I will identify particular aspects of the Court's jurisprudence to make
this point. Further, I will suggest what is needed in order for the
Court to function in a more conciliatory role.
The frame of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in cases
involving indigenous peoples usually focuses on an assessment of the
relevant exercise of federal power. The federal government, and Con-
gress in particular, is deemed to have "plenary power" over Native
Americans, and that power is considered to be subject only to limited
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law, The University of Arizona.
i. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4th ed. 1998).
2. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
Seattle University Law Review
constitutional constraints.3 Native Americans have whatever "resid-
ual" sovereignty and land rights the federal government-or one of the
European colonial powers that preceded it-has not taken away, as
well as those rights and benefits that the government has acted
affirmatively to provide. Such residual rights of dominion over terri-
tory and people extend only insofar as the rights are not inconsistent
with the tribes' status as "domestic dependent" communities.4
Typically absent from the Supreme Court's decisions regarding
Native Americans is adequate attention to historic misdeeds and their
relation to relevant contemporary inequities experienced by Native
Americans. Among these undertreated factors are the taking of indi-
genous peoples' land through fraudulent means, duress, or force; the
outright slaughter of many indigenous women, children, and men who
stood in the way of nonindigenous settlement; and the active suppres-
sion of indigenous religious and cultural patterns and indigenous self-
governance institutions. Such events have been acknowledged or
recounted in Supreme Court narrative mainly to reinforce the domi-
nant mythology of conquest by which Native Americans are rendered
vanquished subjects. "Every American schoolboy knows," wrote Jus-
tice Reed for the Court in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, "that
the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of their ancestral
ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of
acres by treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a
sale but the conquerors' will that deprived them of their land."5
For a jurisprudence concerning indigenous peoples to be in any
sense therapeutic from the standpoint of all concerned, it should
include a recognition of the wrongful nature of historic events and the
suffering those events have caused, rather than a reinforcement of the
conquest myth. Conflicts between the majority and any aggrieved
minority are likely to persist and animosities are likely to fester or flare
unless the historic wrongs that remain alive in the collective memory
of the aggrieved are acknowledged by the agents of the larger society.
Such acknowledgment is a matter of simple dignity for aggrieved
groups, and it provides a basis for treating their claims in a manner
that is considered fair and just by all concerned. When a court
addresses a particular controversy involving an indigenous group, the
history of wrongs that are relevant to the controversy should come to
the fore.
3. Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
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Also mostly absent from the relevant Supreme Court jurispru-
dence is an embrace of process values of the kind that Professor
Nathalie Des Rosiers finds in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1998 Quebec Secession Reference case.6 Professor Des
Rosiers identifies that decision as appropriately placing a high value
on process, particularly a process in which both majority and minority
voices and viewpoints are heard and treated with respect, and in which
the outcome is ideally determined through negotiation and mutual
accommodation rather than through a determination of a winner and a
loser.' This regard for process, in Professor Des Rosiers' estimation,
is evident both in the Court's treatment of the competing narratives of
Quebec secessionists and Canadian federalists as well as in its finding
of a "duty to negotiate" in the event of a vote in favor of secession by a
substantial majority of the Quebec population.8
United States Supreme Court opinions, by contrast, have pro-
vided little support for process-driven solutions to conflicts between
majority institutions and indigenous peoples. The Court's decision in
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie9 exemplifies its method of propa-
gating the conquest myth against indigenous peoples, rendering them
the losers in a winner-take-all contest. The specific issue in that case
concerned the power of the Alaska Native village of Venetie to exact
taxes for business conducted on land owned by the village.' ° The
power of Native communities to tax activity on community or tribal
land is one of the attributes of indigenous sovereignty that the
Supreme Court has recognized." In Venetie, the State of Alaska con-
tested the village's taxing authority, clearly seeing the assertion of such
authority as a threat to its own sovereignty.' 2
The Venetie case, however, was about more than just taxation.
The State of Alaska, invoking the standard frame of analysis for judi-
cial determinations of indigenous issues, argued that the particular
exercise of federal power in Alaska had entirely deprived the village of
Venetie, and virtually all other Native communities in the state, of
governmental jurisdiction over community-held lands.' 3 The litiga-
tion in Venetie thus represented a far-reaching contest over govern-
6. See Nathalie Des Rosiers, From Telling to Listening: A Therapeutic Analysis of the Role of
the Courts in Minority/Majority Conflicts, CT. REV. Spring 2000, at 54 (discussing ref Re
Secession of Quebec, 2 S.C.R. 217 (1998)).
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mental authority between the Native peoples of Alaska and the state
government, which represented the interests of the majority. The
position taken by the state undoubtedly exacerbated the sense of alien-
ation on the part of indigenous peoples and helped consolidate major-
ity sentiment against indigenous claims of continuing sovereignty.
Rather than help bridge the majority-minority divide underlying
the Venetie case, the Supreme Court helped to consolidate it. The
Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, unanimously found
that relevant federal enactments, particularly the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act, 4 rendered Venetie's lands-and, by implica-
tion, most all of the lands now held by indigenous communities in
Alaska-outside the rubric of "Indian country,"'" and hence not lands
to which indigenous sovereignty or governmental authority attached. 6
According to the Court, the condition of Native peoples in Alaska had
been determined by Congress, and that determination on the issue of
the distribution of governmental authority was in favor of the state
and its majority constituency." The Court provided no measure of
validation to the indigenous voice or point of view, and it provided
nothing to engender majority-minority reconciliation over a fractious
issue of fundamental importance to both indigenous and nonindige-
nous people. In typical fashion, upon declaring the indigenous liti-
gants losers, the Court sought to wash its hands of the matter while
reaffirming federal supremacy, stating that any modification in the
outcome "is a question entirely for Congress. "18
Even in rendering decisions that are favorable to indigenous liti-
gants, the Supreme Court has adhered to the conquest myth and
exalted federal supremacy at the expense of process-oriented solutions
of the kind identified by Professor Des Rosiers.'9 In Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, the Court held that Indian
tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from civil suit with regard to trans-
actions occurring both on and off reservation lands, whether or not the
transaction involves tribal governmental activities.2" In his majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy relied on the Court's earlier precedents, but
characterized the doctrine of sovereign immunity as something that
had "developed almost by accident" and that Congress had left
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601 (1994).
15. The court applied the definition of "Indian country" found in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, which
relates to the geographic scope of tribal and related federal jurisdiction. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 526.
16. Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530.
17. Id. at 528.
18. Id. at 534.
19. See generally Des Rosiers, supra note 6.
20. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
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intact. 21 Thus, the Court's holding in favor of tribal sovereign im-
munity was made reluctantly, out of purported deference to Congress.
Justice Kennedy declared that "[t]here are reasons to doubt the
wisdom of perpetuating the doctrine of [tribal sovereign immunity]."22
In examining those reasons, he ignored the historical inequities and
considerations of self-determination, which, from the perspective of
the indigenous litigants, favor maintaining those attributes of indige-
nous sovereignty that indigenous peoples have not freely given up,
including Native governmental institutions' immunity from suit.
Rather, in Justice Kennedy's view, sovereign immunity is an "acci-
dent"-something Congress and the Courts unwittingly allowed to
survive conquest. Kennedy concluded the Court's opinion by inviting
Congress to get on with unfinished business and to limit or do away
with tribal sovereign immunity: "Congress, subject to constitutional
limitations, can alter its limits through explicit legislation. "23
A more recent Kennedy opinion, Rice v. Cayetano, further
demonstrates a judicial tendency in favor of consolidating the con-
quest of indigenous Americans at the expense of supporting process-
driven solutions to indigenous peoples' claims.24 The decision in Rice
rendered invalid the voting procedure for electing the trustees that
govern the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, or OHA, the Hawaii state
agency that administers programs designed for the benefit of people
whose ancestry can be traced to those inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands
prior European arrival in 1778.21 Voting for the OHA trustees was
limited to the same class of people defined by Hawaiian indigenous
ancestry. 2 Because of this voting limitation, people generally regarded
as Native or indigenous Hawaiians have substantially controlled
OHA, although, of course, not without differences of opinion. A
majority of the Court, however, held that the voting limitation consti-
tuted an "explicit, race-based voting qualification," violating the Fif-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As a result of
the Court's holding, Native Hawaiians will no longer be privileged in
the selection of OHA trustees, and Native Hawaiian control over
OHA governance will now have to give way to the dominant political
winds.
21. Id. at 756-58.
22. Id. at 758.
23. Id. at 759.
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The Court's decision in Rice deals a blow to efforts to generate
adequate redress for widely acknowledged historic and continuing
wrongs against Native Hawaiians, who as a group do not qualify for
federal programs or statutory benefits aimed at Native Americans gen-
erally, and whose status under United States law remains ambiguous.
In 1993, Congress adopted a joint resolution acknowledging and apol-
ogizing for historical acts that "resulted in the suppression of the
inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people" and expressing
its "commitment to. . . provide a proper foundation for reconciliation
between the Untied States and the Native Hawaiian peoples."28 In the
aftermath of this joint congressional resolution, the State of Hawaii
stepped up efforts to facilitate a resolution of Native Hawaiian claims
as Native Hawaiian groups pressed their demands with ever greater
effectiveness at the state, national, and international levels. As debate
has continued regarding how best to resolve Native Hawaiian claims
for redress for historical wrongs, OHA has represented an existing
program aimed at benefiting Native Hawaiians, a program justified by
circumstances of historical origins that have not yet been adequately
addressed. The State justified the voting limitation for the OHA
trustees as a means to allow Native Hawaiians themselves to deter-
mine how the program would be administered.2"
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Rice gives no weight to the
historic and continuing inequities suffered by Native Hawaiians in
determining the constitutionality of the OHA voting limitation.
Upon finding that the limitation is a race-based classification, the
limitation for Kennedy becomes just as invidious as the voter qualify-
cations employed in the deep South to exclude or limit voting by
Blacks.3" It is apparently irrelevant that the voting limitation regard-
ing OHA is far from the kind of racially motivated discrimination
present in the other, now infamous schemes, or that, to the contrary,
the OHA voting limitation can be justified as a part of an effort to
redress historic wrongs suffered by a minority. Justice Kennedy's
opinion does invoke history, but his historical narrative is one that
ultimately reinforces the conquest myth with regard to Native Hawai-
ians. Although he acknowledges some suffering and historic wrongs
against Native Hawaiians, the picture that emerges is one of a van-
quished people whose fate has been decided by an inevitable pattern of
history, the outcome of which must now simply be accepted. 1
28. S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
29. Research regarding the status of Native Hawaiian claims in the State of Hawaii and the
OHA programs is on file with the author.
30. Rice, 528 U.S. 495.
31. Id.
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Rather than seek to situate the Court as a conduit for reconcili-
ation, Justice Kennedy's opinion marks the boundaries of the possible
responses to Native Hawaiian claims, and it does so in a manner that
limits creative impulse and stifles conciliatory encounter. For Justice
Kennedy and the concurring Justices, conquest is the presumed state
of affairs, no matter how sad the history experienced by Native
Hawaiians may be. Any effort to address Native Hawaiian grievances
must conform to United States constitutional constraints, which are
defined and imposed without regard to those grievances or the reasons
for them. According to Justice Kennedy,
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but engulfed
by history beyond their control, their sense of loss may extend
down through generations; and their dismay may be shared by
many members of the larger community. As the State of Hawaii
attempts to address these realities, it must, as always, seek the
political consensus that begins with a sense of shared purpose.
One of the necessary beginning points is this principle: The
Constitution of the United States, too, has become the heritage
of all the citizens of Hawaii.32
There is no question that cases involving indigenous peoples
raise difficult issues, and that appellate judges face a daunting chal-
lenge when they confront these issues. In meeting this challenge,
however, the Supreme Court has not advanced what could be called a
therapeutic jurisprudence. Rather, it has propagated a demeaning
myth of conquest and diminished the impact of the indigenous point
of view in the resolution of relevant conflicts. A different, more con-
ciliatory approach is needed. One such approach-something like the
one taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Reference
case-is suggested, ironically, by the last sentence of Justice Ken-
nedy's quote above. That sentence might be read to suggest the
following: that the Constitution can be a basis for a shared discourse,
assisted by the judicial process, that leads to the identification of
common values among indigenous and nonindigenous peoples; these
values in turn, could guide the resolution of indigenous peoples'
claims through appropriate procedures of negotiation involving all
concerned. Unfortunately, that does not appear to be what Justice
Kennedy had in mind. The Supreme Court still has a ways to go
before what it does in relation to indigenous peoples can be called
therapeutic.
32. Id.
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